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NOTES

Accordingly the recent sustention of the New York pooled fund unemployment insurance act goes no higher than the decision of the
Court of Appeals of that state, and the situation is just as though
the United States Supreme Court had never granted certiorari-in
fact as though certiorari had never even been applied for. This fact
was fully appreciated by the statutory three-judge federal court which
unanimously held that the almost identical Alabama act violates both
the state and the federal constitutions, and refused to pay any attention to the New York decision.2 2 This Alabama case is now before the
United States Supreme Court on appeal. Accordingly the score now
stands on pooled fund laws: New York's law sustained by the Court
of Appeals of that state by a five to two vote, Alabama's law declared
unconstitutional unanimously by a three-judge federal court and
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the Massachusetts law
declared constitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of that state,
and certiorari denied, no action whatever as yet by the Supreme Court
of the United States. No reserve-type law has yet been even questioned
in the courts; but in California a quasi-reserve type, i. e. "New Hampshire type," law has been sustained.
ROGER SHERMAN HOAR.

LOTTERIEs-"BANK-NIGHT"-CONSIDERATION

FOR CHANCE.-Ad-

vertising schemes such as "bank-night," "Hollywood," "country-store"
and the like, have been challenged in both criminal and civil proceedings as lotteries. Generally a lottery is defined as a device for the distribution of prizes by chance.' More specifically it is a scheme for the
disposal or distribution of property by chance among persons who have
paid, or promised or agreed to pay, any valuable consideration for the
chance of obtaining such property.2 Three necessary elements will at
once be distinguished, first, the giving away of property, second,
chance, and third, consideration for the chance. 3
Although the first two elements are usually found in the "banknight" cases, the third element of consideration has caused the courts
to follow diverging paths. It is certainly permissible for a theater to
present its patrons with gifts in appreciation of attendance, and it
would seem that it should make little difference that such a distribution of gifts is made to depend on chance. But once a consideration is
paid for the chance, the whole scheme is a lottery. Neither the Wisconsin4 nor federal statutes 5 define a lottery, although both have proprints, as to render it very difficult to trace the history of the situation. This
present article employs corrected citations.
22 Southern Coal & Coke Co. v. Carmichael, 17 F. Supp. 225 (D. Ala. 1936).
1 BouviER, LAW DIc'noNARx (8th ed. 1914).
2 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY, (3d ed. 1933).
3 State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N.W. 608 (1936).
4Wxs. CONST. art. IV, § 24; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 348.01 (setting up or promoting a lottery), § 348.02 (selling tickets for a lottery), § 348.03 (advertising
tickets), M 348.04, 348.05 (fictitious lottery), § 348.06 (prizes forfeited to the
state).

5 17 STAT. 294, 302 (1872), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 336, 337 (1927) ; 28 STAT. 963 (1895),

18 U.S.C.A. 387 (1927).
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visions thereon. Nevertheless by decision, the three elements above are
recognized as necessary to constitute a lotterys
In regard to consideration, if patrons of a theater pay the same
price for a ticket on "bank-night" as on any other night, and the
quality of the entertainment is not reduced for that particular evening,
such as the showing of one feature picture instead of the usual two,7
it is nevertheless the opinion of some courts that the benefit of increased
attendance is a sufficient consideration for the chance of winning a
prize to make the scheme a lottery. The fact that prizes of more or
less value are to be given will attract persons to the theater who would
not otherwise attend. In this manner those obtaining prizes pay consideration for them, and the theaters reap a direct financial benefit.
Even in cases where tickets are not purchased, as in those cases where
by mere attendance at stores or auction sales 9 one is given a chance
on a valuable prize, though he purchases nothing, the very fact of
coming is held to be a sufficient consideration for the chance. However,
in other than theater cases, this appears to be the minority rule. It is
not contested that consideration for the chance of winning a prize
might be either direct or indirect, but the majority holds that such
attendance without being required to make a purchase is not even
indirect consideration." The expectation that those who come might
purchase goods and thereby increase trade is a benefit too remote to
constitute a consideration for the chance and make the scheme a lottery prohibited by law. But where something is paid out, such as money
for a ticket, despite the fact that if no "bank-night" were conducted,
the price of a ticket would most likely be the same, the scheme in the
absence of saving circumstances, is held to be a lottery. The saving
circumstances may be of various kinds. Winners might not be obliged
to be in the theater when the prizes are drawn, but are usually given
a very limited time to appear. Tickets might be distributed free of
charge without paying admission, and the winner likewise need not be
present but must make his appearance usually within five minutes
after the drawing.
1 State v. Williams (N.H. 1936), 182 Atl. 202; State v. Matthews (W.Va. 1936),

184 S.E. 665.

7 Central State Theater Corp. v. Patz, 11 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. Iowa 1935). An
outstanding picture was shown on bank night, lasting approximately two
hours; but on other nights of the week, two feature pictures were shown
and the entertainment lasted two and one-half hours.
8 Society Theater v. Seattle, 118 Wash. 258, 203 Pac. 21 (1922). The chances
were distributed only after the patrons were in the theater. The prizes were
furnished by merchants who were advertised as the donors.
9The English doctrine holds such a scheme to be a lottery because, looking
at the plan as a whole, the increase in sales is a consideration, though a winner did not necessarily have to make a purchase. Willis v. Young and Stembridge [1907] 1 K.B. 448. This is the minority rule in the United States.
Maughs v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161 S.E. 242 (1931). Here the defendant was
unwilling to give a prize after it was raffled and pleaded lack of consideration
for the chance. Consideration was found, but this made the scheme a lottery
and defendant prevailed despite his defense.
10 The courts recognize indirect as well as direct consideration, but often differ
radically in the interpretation of indirect consideration. Yellowstone Kit v.
State of Alabama, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338, 7 L.R.A. 599 (1890) ; cf. Cross v.
People, 18 Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821 (1893),
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NOTES

In the leading case of State v. Danz," decided in 1926 before
"bank-night" came into existence, the bone of contention being the
legality of a scheme known as "Country-store," the Washington court
decided by a four to five decision that even though free chances were
given without the necessity of buying an admission ticket, there was
consideration for the chance and therefore a lottery. The majority of
the court felt that, since the free chances were little used, they were
mrely a device to escape the lottery law.
The same principle has been followed by the Michigan court,12
where, although no tickets were given free, the court held the scheme
a lottery on the ground that the gratuitous distribution of money or
property was merely a device to evade the law. This case, however,
does not afford a precedent for "bank-night" cases because under the
Michigan statutes, 3 any disposition of property, real or personal, by
way of lottery or gift enterprise, is prohibited. The court holds the
plan a lottery, but that it was influenced by the wider scope of the
statute cannot be doubted.
But, to refer once more to the five to four Washington decision,
there are later cases which seem to follow the minority opinion. If the
holder of a chance ticket need not pay consideration for it by way
of admission or otherwise, and if he need not be present in the theater
at the time of the drawing, although only a nominal time is given him
to make his appearance after the drawing, and if he need not pay an
admission to enter and claim the prize should he be declared the winner, courts are hesitant to say that, nevertheless, the benefit of
increased attendance is a consideration for the chance.14 Courts which
follow this line of authority distinguish seemingly contradictory decisions on one of two grounds. Either, in non-theater cases, chances were
furnished only to customers, or those who purchased goods. Or, in
theater cases and others, while the distribution of chances purported
to be both to customers, and to those who were not customers the
distribution to the latter class was in fact negligible. 5 But where free
participation is a reality, indirect benefit to the operator of the scheme,
standing alone, is not enough to create a consideration.
The decision in this Washington case seems to have been followed in only one other case, a Colorado case 6 But even here the
ruling of the court can be explained on the ground that the distribution
of free chances was negligible in comparison to those accompanying
admission tickets. Besides, this was not a case of a criminal nature.
"'140 Wash. 546, 250 Pac. 37 (1926).
12 Sproat-Temple Theater Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise (Mich. 1936),
267 N.W. 602.
13 MxcH. ComP. LAvs (1934, Supp.) §§ 16611-16612.
14 Indirect benefit, when free participation is a reality, is not enough. State v.
Eames (N.H. 1936), 183 Atl. 590. Here the participants had to be registered
in a book, but registrants were not required to purchase admission tickets.
The winner had to make his appearance five minutes after the drawing. The
same situation prevailed in People v. Cardas (Cal. App. 1933), 28 P. (2d) 99
(1933).
15 People v. Cardas, supra, note 14, 28 P. (2d) at 101.
1"General Theaters v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer D. Corp., 9 F. Supp. 546 (Colo.
1935). Many of the tickets were given away in drug stores, but had to be
deposited at the theater, although no admission was charged to do this. The
winner was not required to be present.
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It was a proceeding in equity by the theater to compel producers to
continue to distribute films to the plaintiff. The defendants had threatened to refuse, not because the plaintiff was conducting a lottery, but
because under the "N.R.A." code, the plaintiff by his scheme was violating a code practice. Although it did not expressly term the device
a lottery, the court said that it was in its essence a gamble, appealing
to the cupidity of the public and opposed to public policy and good
business ethics.
WILLIAM KETTERER.

